David ross biography

So in the simple case discussed above Ross claimed that our actual duty was to help the accident victims and that prima facie duties could be defined in terms of contributing to or potentially explaining why it is our duty proper. In this case, the idea of a prima facie duty and our actual duty are not in the end distinct Hurka , He seemed to change his mind about this in FE, where following Broad, he took the idea of a prima facie duty to be basic and he understood it in terms of fittingness to some aspect of a situation FE 79—82, 84; Broad , — In the simple case above, keeping your promise to your friend is a prima facie duty as it is fitting to one aspect of the situation and benefitting the accident victims is another prima facie duty as it is fitting to another aspect of the situation.

It is not entirely clear whether in FE Ross relied on to the concept of duty proper or instead whether he relied on the idea of duty all things considered Hurka , 74— Ross intimates his list is the best representation of the core commitments of common-sense morality RG 20; FE He is sanguine we have these responsibilities. He is not entirely confident there exist only five basic responsibilities.

But if new circumstances can lead to the recognition of new duties, why may they not lead to the recognition there are fewer basic duties than we might otherwise have supposed? This seems to be the nub of the issue between Ross and his ideal utilitarian foes. In Some Problems in Ethics , H. Ross is moved in part by this sort of worry.

His version of beneficence involves the promotion of as much as possible of the four goods of pleasure, virtue, knowledge and justice RG 27, Indeed, his case against his ideal utilitarian foes Moore, Rashdall, and Joseph is strong since they adopt a form of value pluralism for similar reasons. Ross has a further argument against Rawls. His first principle outlining a set of basic rights takes priority over his second principle outlining the correct distribution of social benefits and burdens.

Rawls does not think it is ever right to violate rights in order to produce just distributions. But Ross can argue Rawls achieves system at the expense of endorsing absolutism, which many acknowledge to have counterintuitive results. Might gaining a massive benefit for the least well off not justify a trivial rights violation? We might wonder whether this is the case.

It is relatively clear most hedonistic utilitarians are reformers of common-sense morality e. These philosophers may not be moved at the level of moral foundations by claims their view conflicts with common-sense morality. For their aim in part is to revise it and make moral deliberation more systematic. Ross gives hedonism short shrift because he thinks it obvious pleasure is not the only intrinsic value RG 17, 99; FE He often argues ideal utilitarianism, like hedonistic utilitarianism, can be dismissed because it is at odds with common-sense morality RG 17—19, 38; FE 67ff.

Yet, it is far from clear ideal utilitarianism is reformist like hedonistic or classical utilitarianism. The better way to represent the dispute between ideal utilitarians and Ross is over which view best represents common-sense moral thinking. It is certainly true that the main proponents of ideal utilitarianism took themselves to be aiming to provide the best representation of common-sense morality e.

It might be true that promises are not a device for promoting well-being but false they are not a device for promoting the good, which is the point ideal utilitarians wish to make. Ross employs the following example to illustrate his initial case RG 34— Suppose by fulfilling a promise to Edward you produce units of surplus good for him, but by breaking the promise and doing something else you have not promised to do you produce units of surplus good for James.

The ideal utilitarian view entails it is wrong to fulfil the promise: we must benefit James. But this is not the verdict of common-sense morality. Ross says it takes a much greater disparity in value between the two to justify breaking the promise RG 35; FE 77, In reply, the ideal utilitarian may try to capture the common-sense verdict by noting breaking promises erodes mutual confidence and keeping promises enhances mutual confidence RG 38; FE These goods and evils tip the balance in favour of keeping the promise.

Ross frowns on this response. There will no doubt be cases, he says, where all the benefits of breaking the promise will outweigh though only very slightly all the costs associated with breaking it, and in this case the ideal utilitarian will have to admit it is obligatory to break the promise RG Ross thinks this is not the verdict of common-sense morality.

Classical utilitarians might think in this case we should revise common-sense morality. If after all is said and done, it is better to break a promise, we should break it. They might insist that on sober reflection common sense is mistaken and promises just are devices for promoting well-being.

David ross biography

Ideal utilitarians seem to opt for a different strategy. In an engaging set of essays, W. Pickard-Cambridge presses Ross on the issue of whether ideal utilitarianism is actually as at odds with common-sense morality as Ross suggests Pickard-Cambridge a, b, c. Pickard-Cambridge first argues there are strong direct and indirect reasons for taking promises very seriously Pickard-Cambridge b, — He argues further ideal utilitarianism accounts better for our common-sense attitudes about cases of the following kind:.

Both Peter and Chuck assume if by Peter is rendered unable ever to use his violin, the promise is null and void. But the ideal utilitarian may say she can provide an interpretation of the promise and that her interpretation and its explanation fit more easily with common-sense morality. Peter and Chuck assume what they do because no good would otherwise come from insisting on the promise being fulfilled.

The miser lied. Therefore, the promise is null and void. The difficulty with this reply is for it to work Ross has to assume the implied contract stipulates we are to tell each other the whole or all the truth. But he may not be entitled to this assumption. It is not obvious that when I sell you something I am required to tell you all the truths about the item for sale.

The ideal utilitarian is in a better position to explain why in the case of the miser the implied contract to tell the truth requires one not lie about being a beggar. The contract is specified this way because it is beneficial for it to be so specified: it is not in general beneficial to honour fraudulent promises. This is not plausible. There is no reason to enrich an already rich person merely because of carelessness of this sort.

But what drives this interpretation of the promise? The ideal utilitarian may say the reason we interpret the promise this way is doing so is on balance beneficial. Furthermore, the ideal utilitarian can argue that even without thinking of this interpretation of the promise we still believe we have no or only very weak reasons to pay, and that they can offer the best explanation of this fact.

They can also explain why this is as Ross notes a somewhat difficult issue to decide: there are utilitarian reasons on either side. Pickard-Cambridge further argues ideal utilitarianism provides the best explanation of the strength of a promise b, — Ross agrees some promises are more binding than others. A promise to visit a sick friend is stronger than the promise to attend the theatre with friends FE He suggests the former is stronger because of the value of what is being promised FE An explicit promise is more binding than a casual promise and more recent promise is more binding than an older promise.

Ross has one final reply to Pickard-Cambridge, using the following example. A is dying. Suppose D could make better use of the property than C. It follows on ideal utilitarianism B ought to give the property to D. The version of ideal utilitarianism to which Pickard-Cambridge subscribes seems to entail B has no reason to fulfil the promise to A.

This is a problem for the view. This suggests the rightness of the promise depends on it producing some pleasure or satisfaction for A. This seems to put him at odds with the plain man in other cases, however. Consider a deathbed promise with a different content, that A be buried with C , his wife. Suppose this promise is not bonific.

Hence, he may have to advocate revision to common-sense morality. Perhaps he can argue his revision is more conservative than the revisions required by ideal utilitarianism. But this is a very thin difference; it may not be enough to give Ross the edge. Given these worries and the fact that ideal utilitarianism seems quite close to the plain man or common-sense morality in many of the other important cases, its entailing it is right to break the promise in the initial case above can hardly be considered a death blow.

The ideal utilitarian may not be satisfied with this outcome. Perhaps the more appropriate route is not to opt for revision to common-sense morality. Instead, perhaps the better strategy is to capture the importance of promise keeping to common-sense morality by holding that keeping promises is non-instrumentally good or at least that breaking a promise is non-instrumentally bad Brennan ; Ewing , ; Johnson , ; Shaver This is a compelling response.

To assess it, it is important to examine his theory of value. Phillips, for example, agrees Ross holds, at least initially, there are five foundational duties Phillips , 58— Ross pays little attention to the duty of non-maleficence. His main focus is his four other duties — fidelity, reparation, gratitude, and beneficence — which have a similar structure.

Each involves promoting some good or goods RG ; —9: — We have a general reason to promote various goods on grounds of beneficence, and the duties of fidelity, reparation, and gratitude function to intensify reasons to provide certain goods to certain people Phillips , 67ff. So, for example, if I can benefit a benefactor or a total stranger to the same degree, I have more reason — the reason is more intense — to benefit my benefactor because I have a responsibility of gratitude to them.

The duty of non-maleficence is not like this: it does not involve promoting a good Hurka , —83; Phillips , 86— Phillips thinks there are good reasons to jettison the duty of non-maleficence. Ross suggests the duty of non-maleficence in some way constrains what we are permitted to do to promote general good. It is not permissible, for example, to kill one person to prevent two other people from being killed.

The concern is: How can it be wrong to harm one person when by harming one person one can prevent two other people from being harmed? Phillips does not abandon non-maleficence entirely. Instead, he attempts to capture our intuitions about the distinctive badness of harming or injuring by treating harming or injuring as a higher-level evil, involving an unfitting attitude willing or wanting toward a base-level evil harming or injuring Phillips , It is vicious to want to harm or injure someone, because harming or injuring another person is bad.

In addition, it is far from clear Phillips has established harming is a distinctive evil as compared with nonbeneficence. Phillips says whereas harming or injuring involves the unfitting attitude of wanting or aiming at a base bad harm or injury , failure to benefit involves no bad attitude and so is not as bad as harming Phillips , This may not be obvious.

When I fail to benefit I am indifferent to something good. This seems a wrong attitude to have to a base good benefits , making nonbeneficence no worse than harming. Of course, it is possible this indifference is not necessarily involved in nonbeneficence, in which case it would not be as bad harming or injuring. But it is far from clear that when I harm someone I necessarily will or desire injuring or harming them, in which case harming would not be worse than nonbeneficence.

I might merely be aiming or willing benefits that my harming produces for these criticisms, see Shaver , Sidgwick famously claimed egoism and utilitarianism represent coordinate but conflicting requirements of rationality. On his view, we ought to maximise our own happiness and maximise general happiness Sidgwick , — Sidgwick thought it could not be proved to the egoist that their happiness was not for them all important and so the egoist could not be rationally converted to utilitarianism Sidgwick , In defending egoism, Sidgwick endorsed the existence of non-derivative agent-relative reasons.

My good provides me with a special reason to promote my happiness, a reason individuals other than me lack. These reasons compete and sometimes conflict with the agent neutral reasons provided by utilitarianism. Many philosophers agree e. The difficulty is Ross seems to be of the view we have no reason whatsoever to promote our own happiness Parfit , He thinks the only duties in existence are moral duties.

This is hard to accept. Phillips can easily accommodate this thought since he holds the best way to understand prima facie duties is in terms of reasons rather than moral reasons or duties. Ross seems also to think we have no reason to avoid our own pain. This comes out clearly in his characterisations of the duty of non-maleficence. He seems, then, to think while I have a prima facie duty not to harm others, I have no such duty not to harm myself.

It seems to follow, then, it would not be morally wrong for me to impose a very large pain on myself to avoid only a trivial pain for another. It seems morally wrong to use oneself in this way. And even if we are convinced we lack a moral duty to prevent our own pain we are very unlikely to be convinced we lack strong non-moral reason to prevent it.

Ross may have to modify his duty of non-maleficence to accommodate this. We might agree with him pace Kant when the net benefits of lying are considerable we have an obligation to lie, but disagree with his claim veracity is not a foundational prima facie duty like fidelity and gratitude. Ross does not give an argument for why there is no foundational prima facie duty of veracity.

As noted, Ross says the duty not to lie rests in part on the duty of non-maleficence. It is wrong to lie because it involves inflicting a positive injury on another person RG This might be true in part. But one might imagine someone replying with a claim similar to the one Ross makes in reply to utilitarian attempts to show the duty of fidelity to promises is not foundational, namely, that, like promise keeping, veracity is not just a device for preventing bad outcomes.

Again, this might capture some of what we think wrong with lying, but it may not provide the full account of what makes it wrong. When we consider ourselves bound to tell the truth we are not clearly of the view doing so will promote pleasure for the individual to whom we owe the obligation. We think we ought to tell the truth, but this is not obviously accompanied by the thought doing so will bring into existence pleasure for the student.

It is possible, of course, that we might think telling the truth is accompanied by the thought doing so will produce some other good e. But someone keen on a prima facie duty of veracity might insist even when no good is at stake it might still be prima facie right to tell the truth. It is hard to know what Ross can say to someone who insists on a self-standing prima facie duty of veracity like Price , This is but one element of justice, as Ross allows.

He says this fact reinforces our obligations of justice. Ross may be right. There are other issues of justice Ross does not touch on. For example, Ross says very little about equality in the distribution of scare resources. Some think in distributing scarce medical resources e. Ross might think considerations of this sort are captured by the duty of beneficence.

But many might think we should give priority to the least well off even if this fails to promote the best outcomes. Ross may need to include a prima facie duty of equity in his list to accommodate the full inventory of issues relating to justice. Virtue, knowledge and pleasure are states of mind, while justice is a relation between states of mind virtue and pleasure RG Ross does not think these values are of the same importance.

He ranks them. Virtue is ranked highest. As noted, there are three virtuous desires. These, too, are ranked. Knowledge is the next best, followed by right opinion. Knowledge is better than right opinion, for two reasons. Second, knowledge involves certainty which right opinion lacks RG 30, —, The least valuable is pleasure RG It is not implausible to think it should be placed between virtuous knowledge and pleasure, and therefore the values are ranked as follows: virtue, virtuous knowledge, justice and pleasure.

In FE, Ross defends a slightly different view. He appears to maintain there are four non-instrumental values FE 19, 73, , , , — :. In RG, Ross maintains all non-instrumental values are valuable in the same way: their goodness is intrinsic to them RG , , ; also OJ ; he returns to this position at KT 11—12;. In FE, he adopts a different stance.

By contrast, the value of justice and pleasure is not intrinsic to them; rather, their value is based on a relation involving us rightly taking an interest or rightly finding some kind of satisfaction in them FE This distinction between types of non-instrumental value permits Ross to explain two things he thinks true of pleasure:.

The reason only innocent pleasure is valuable is only it is an object worthy of satisfaction. For Ross, it is not right to take satisfaction in, for instance, undeserved pleasure or pleasure in cruelty or lust. The reason only the pleasure of others is valuable is, again, only in it is it right for one to take satisfaction. In section 4. These are not fit objects of dis satisfaction.

Hence, we have no duty to prevent our own pain or promote our own pleasure. Despite his lack of confidence, he affirmed in RG an obligation to promote our own happiness under the obligation of beneficence RG 25— Ross —29, — Ross is often unclear about the value and status of justice. Retrieved 6 January The Sunday Times. ISSN Retrieved 24 July Archived from the original on 11 April Retrieved 10 June The Guardian.

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